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Comments
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ABOLITION OF
FEDERAL "COMMON LAW"
One of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
is said to have remarked recently that laymen are apt to overlook
a late unspectacular decision whose consequences far outweigh
those of any of the much discussed New Deal cases. The justice
had reference to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which, in overruling the celebrated case of Swift v. Tyson,2 upset the settled
jurisprudence of nearly a century on the subject of federal common law. Although unnoticed by the general public, the Erie case
has not escaped the serious attention of the members of the legal
profession.$
It will be recalled that in Swift v. Tyson,4 Chief Justice Story
laid down the rule that in matters of general jurisprudence the
federal courts need not follow the case law of the states when
1. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 787, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938). In this
case Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, while walking along a footpath
which ran parallel to the Erie Railroad's right-of-way near Hughestown,
Pennsylvania, was injured by a swinging door on a passing freight car. Suit
was brought in the federal court for the Southern District of New York. The
railroad claimed that its liability should be determined by the decisions of the
courts of the state of Pennsylvania and that under these decisions the plaintiff would be denied recovery. Tompkins, on the contrary, relying on the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842), contended that tort
liability was a matter of 'general law' and that hence the decisions of the
courts of Pennsylvania were not controlling. There was verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the judgment [90 F. (2d.) 603 (1937)] on the authority of Swift v. Tyson. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that Swift v. Tyson was an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power by the Courts of the United States in contravention of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. It therefore reversed
the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the case. The
majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Brandeis. Mr. Justice Butler
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice McReynolds joined. Mr. Justice Reed concurred with the majority in part only, while Mr. Justice Cardozo
took no part In the consideration or decision of the case.
2. 41 U. S. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842).
3. The case was the subject of an address by Solicitor General Jackson
before the American Bar Association at Its meeting In Cleveland July 25-30.
Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 24 A.B.A.J. 609.
4. The question involved in this celebrated case was whether or not a
bona fide holder of a promissory note given in consideration of a pre-existing
debt took free and clear of equities between the original parties. Suit was
brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
New York. The Supreme Court assumed that the decision of the state of
New York decided that a pre-existing debt did not so protect the bona fide
[161]
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5
exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship.
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 17896 had directed the federal
courts to apply state law in diversity matters. In the Swift case
the court interpreted "law" to mean "local law," that is, state
constitutions, state statutes, and decisions interpreting them; and
decisions on local usages with respect to immovable property. Decisions on commercial matters and questions of general jurisprudence were held to be outside the operation of the statute.

In the course of time there developed a very substantial body
of federal law, differing from that of the states, on subjects over
which the states, and not the Federal Government, have general
jurisdiction. There grew up, for example, federal rules of commercial law, federal rules of tort law, federal rules respecting validity
of the subject matter of contract, and the like. The effect of this
situation was to give non-residents a choice of law as well as a
choice of courts when the subject matter of the suit was one of
general jurisprudence. 7 Whether or not this discrimination as to
rules of law was intended by Congress has long been the subject
of learned controversy." It is agreed by all that federal jurisdicholder. Yet it held through Mr. Justice Story that the New York decisions
were not controlling on the federal courts and that the New York rule should
not be followed. 41 U.S. 1, 14-24, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842).
5. U. S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
6. "The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties
or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply." 1 Stat. 92 (1789) 28 U.S.C. § 725
(1938).
7. This is illustrated in the well-known decision of Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533, 48 S.Ct. 404, 72 L.Ed. 681 (1928). There a Kentucky taxicab corporation made a contract with a railroad corporation for the exclusive privilege of going on the railroad's premises to conduct the taxicab business. By a
series of decisions of the Supreme Court of Kentucky this contract was
clearly illegal. The Kentucky taxicab corporation was dissolved, was reincorporated in Tennessee under the same name, and concluded an identical contract with the railroad corporation. The Supreme Court of the United States
sustained this patent device to avoid the effect of state decisions by holding
that the matter was one of general law and that thus the federal courts need
not follow state decisions in disposing of it. See Dobie, Seven Implications of
Swift v. Tyson (1930) 16 Va. L. Rev. 225, 227, 239-240. In many quarters the
rule of Swift v. Tyson was felt to be so repugnant as to justify total abolition
of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Campbell, Is Swift vs.
Tyson an Argument for or Against Abolishing Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction? (1932) 18 A.B.A.J. 809; Dobie, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
(1928) 185.
8. The authorities are collected in the margin of the court's opinion in
the Brie case. See particularly notes 3 to 7, 58 S.Ct. 819-820. Perhaps attention
should be directed to the researches of Charles Warren on the intention of the
framers of this section of the Judiciary Act. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49.
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tion on the ground of diversity of citizenship was intended to assure to nonresident litigants a choice of courts, that is, to permit
them to be heard by a tribunal presumably disinterested in the
residency of the parties. But there is fundamental disagreement
on the following questions: (a) Did Congress intend to permit
nonresidents to claim the benefit of substantive rules of law different from those which would be applied between residents by
allowing the federal courts to develop their own rules of law?
(b) If Congress did so intend does the Constitution permit such
discrimination?
The three opinions written in the Erie Railroadcase answered
these two questions as follows:
1. The majority (speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis)
held that Congress did not intend to exempt state decisions from
the operation of the Act. If Congress had so intended, said the
Court, then the result would be unconstitutional as an invasion of
states' rights. The fact that the federal courts interpreted the Act
in this way was in itself an unconstitutional invasion of states'
rights on the part of these courts.
2. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Butler took the position that Congress intended to permit federal courts to apply their
own rules of law to matters of general law; that the Constitution
sanctioned this result; that one hundred years of jurisprudence
unshakably attested that intention; that so vital a rule of law
should not be overthrown without extended examination by the
court; that the recent legislation respecting federal courts required
them tonotify the Attorney General when the constitutionality of
a federal statute was at issue, and since this had not been done,
that the case should be set down for rehearing; and, finally, that
the constitutionality of the rule of Swift v. Tyson need not be considered since the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
and (presumably) could not recover even under the federal rule.
Mr. Justice McReynolds joined in this dissent.
3. In an opinion concurring in part with the majority, Mr.
Justice Reed agreed that Swift v. Tyson should be overruled on
the ground that Congress had not intended its result. He disagreed, however, with the view of the majority that Congress
would be unable to enact such a provision of law since he felt that
the "necessary and proper" clause of Article 1, Section 8 together
with the Judiciary Article of the Constitution might well authorize Congress so to legislate.
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There are two aspects of this momentous case which call for
discussion. One is the scope and effect of the new doctrine that
federal courts must apply state decisions generally. This involves
a question of what cases are overruled because dependent upon
Swift v. Tyson, and what the effect of the new rule will be. This
aspect of the decision has already been the subject of criticism
and reviewY The second aspect of the case and the one which
mainly concerns us here involves its constitutional features. What
will be the effect, for example, of holding Swift v. Tyson unconstitutional, and whether the issue of constitutionality was actually
necessary to the decision of the Erie case.
EFFECT OF THE NEW RULE

It is not the purpose of this comment to raise the question
whether Swift v. Tyson should have been overruled. The literature on that subject is immense. 10 The case has had able supporters and learned antagonists. Presumably, these writers will maintain their former attitude in considering the Erie case. The only
change is in the relative position of friend or foe. Hence, anyone
interested in the desirability of the rule of the Erie case may still
consult that body of doctrine.
The question of the effect of the new rule, however, is of immediate practical importance. The majority opinion states categorically: "There is no federal general common law."" Section 34
is held to include state decisions as well as state statutes. It is
fair to assume, therefore, that every decision of the federal courts
is suspect in which a rule different from that laid down by the
decisional law of the state courts has been followed. An examination of some of the instances in which the old rule has been applied by the federal courts should therefore serve to illustrate
the important changes likely to be effected by the new rule.
The following is a brief enumeration of important matters in
which federal courts have ignored relevant decisions of state
12
courts and have applied their own rules of law.
9. For a discussion of this phase of the decision see McCormick and
Hewins, The Collapse of "General Law" in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 II1.
L. Rev. 126; Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1336;
Schmidt, Substantive Law Applied by the Federal Courts-Effect of Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 16 Texas L. Rev. 512; Jackson, The Rise and Fall of
Swift v. Tyson (1938) 24 A.B.A.J. 609.
10. Supra note 8.
11. 58 S.Ct. at 822.

12. See margin of the court's opinion In the Erie case, 58 S.Ct. at 821, n.
11-18.
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1. Commercial paper. This was the direct result of the holding in Swift v. Tyson, which involved a question of past consideration in negotiable instruments." After the widespread adoption
of the Negotiable Instruments Law it was expected that the federal courts would follow state decisions on the act. However, this
was not always done, and the matter seems not to have been put
at rest until the Supreme Court finally held in the Burns Mortgage Company case 1 that state court interpretations of the Negotiable Instruments Law were binding on federal courts. The rights
of holders of bonds of municipalities, however, are matters of gen15
eral jurisprudence.
2. Contracts. The interpretation of contracts has usually
been held to be a matter of general law.'6 So also is the validity of
a release," or of an arbitration agreement.' The effect of a contract of one non compos mentis has been held to be subject to
general rather than local law.'9
3. Torts. The ordinary rules of negligence,2 0 for example,
and the effect of contributory negligence 21 are usually regarded as
13. Swift v. Tyson was followed in Miller v. Austen, 54 U.S. 218, 14 L.Ed.
119 (1851); Oakes v. Montgomery First Nat'l Bank, 100 U.S. 239, 25 L.Ed. 580
(1879); Brooklyn City R. Co. v. National Bank of Republic, 102 U. S. 14, 26
L.Ed. 61 (1880); Jewett v. Hone, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7311 (1873); Farmers' National Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 52 Fed. 191 (C.C.A. 6th, 1892); Phipps v. Harding, 70 Fed. 468 (C.C.A. 7th, 1895); Northern Nat. Bank v. Hoopes, 98 Fed.
935 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1900); Citizens' Savings Bank v. Newburyport, 169 Fed. 766
(C.C.A. 1st, 1909); Forrest v. Safety Banking and Trust Co., 174 Fed. 345 (C.C.
E.D. Pa. 1909); Rochester Security Trust Co. v. Des Moines County, 198 Fed.
331 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1909); Shenandoah National Bank v. Liewer, 187 Fed. 16
(C.C.A. 8th, 1911); Young v. Lowry, 192 Fed. 825 (C.C.A. 3d, 1912); North Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 13 F. (2d) 585 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926); Sears v. Greater
New York Development Co., 51 F. (2d) 46 (C.C.A. 1st, 1931); The Sagittarius,
57 F. (2d) 756 (D.C. Mass. 1932).
14. Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487, 54 S.Ct. 813, 78 L.Ed. 1380
(1934). For a criticism of this decision see Beutel, Common Law Judicial
Technique and the Law of Negotiable Instruments-Two Unfortunate Decisions (1934) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 64.
15. Cf. Wade v. Travis County, 174 U.S. 499, 19 S.Ct. 715, 43 L.Ed. 1060
(1899); Board of Education v. James, 49 F. (2d) 91 (C.C.A. 10th, 1931).
16. Delmas v. Merchants' Mutual Insurance Co., 81 U.S. 661, 20 L.Ed. 757
(1872); Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow
Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 48 S.Ct. 404, 72 L.Ed. 681 (1928);
Phelps v. Board of Education, 300 U.S. 319, 57 S.Ct. 483, 81 L.Ed. 674 (1937).
17. Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405 (C.C.A. 9th, 1923).
18. United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 Fed. 1006 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1915); Rae v. Luzerne County, 58 F. (2d) 829
(D.C.M.D. Pa. 1932).
19. Edwards v. Davenport, 20 Fed. 756 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1883).
20. Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 82 U.S. 401, 21 L.Ed. 114 (1872); Railroad Co.
v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 21 L.Ed. 745 (1873); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. McDonald,
152 U.S. 262, 14 S.Ct. 619, 38 L.Ed. 434 (1894); Commercial Electric Supply Co.
v. Gresdmer, 59 F. (2d) 512 (C.C.A. 6th, 1932).
21. Hemingway v. I.C.R. Co., 114 Fed. 843 (C.C.A. 5th, 1902); Central Ver-
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matters of general jurisprudence. So also are liability for negligence of employees, 22 the extent of the liability of railroads and
telegraph companies for negligence,2 3 and the effect of agreements
2
to limit such liability. '
4. Immovable Property. Even in cases involving immovable
property the federal courts have sometimes refused to follow the
25
decisions of the courts of the state wherein the object is located,
particularly if the state decisions were rendered after rights had
2
accrued.
5. Measure of damages. The general principle is that the fed27
eral courts apply their own rules for the measure of damages.
6. Evidence. The parole evidence rule is a matter of general,
law.2 8
local,
not
7. Conflict of laws. It has been generally held that the federal courts will determine for themselves rules of the conflict of
laws. 29 What effect the Erie case will have upon that doctrine is
largely a matter of conjecture.
This brief survey of the matters heretofore falling outside of
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act serve to illustrate the vast scope
of the Erie case. Doubtless a cloud of litigation will ensue to determine the extent of the decision, and its applicability wherever
the rule of Swift v. Tyson has been enforced. 0 We can do no
more than speculate on the outcome of the new rule. Certainly it
is bound to have serious effect on those engagements entered into
and those commitments already made in reliance on a century of
jurisprudence stemming from Swift v. Tyson.
mont R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 S.Ct. 865, 59 L.Ed. 1433 (1915); Butler
v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 2 F. Supp. 226 (D.C.W.D. La. 1932).
22. Coyne v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 133 U.S. 370, 10 S.Ct. 382, 33 L.Ed. 651
(1890); Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 13 S.Ct. 914, 37 L.Ed.
772 (1893).
23. Supra note 20.
24. New York Central Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 21 L.Ed. 627
(1873).
25. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. at 821 n. 15-18.
26. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 360, 30 S.Ct. 140, 54 L.Ed.
228 (1910).
27. Lake Shore and M.S.R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 13 S.Ct. 261, 37
L.Ed. 97 (1893).
28. Sioux Falls Nat. Bk. v. Klaveness, 264 Fed. 40 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920).
29. Dygert v. Vermont Loan Co., 94 Fed. 913 (C.C.A. 9th, 1899).
30. For example, the court has already determined that the new rule applies as well in equity as at law. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 58 S.Ct.
860, 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938). This decision was to be expected since It has long
been settled that § 34 covers equity cases in spite of the apparent limitation
of the words of the statute to "trials at common law." Mason v. United States,
260 U. S. 545, 43 S.Ct. 200, 67 L.Ed. 396 (1923).
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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

As has been indicated above, the Erie case has certain very interesting constitutional aspects. In the first place, the majority accepts the pronouncement of Mr. Justice Holmes that the rule of
Swift v. Tyson is "an unconstitutional assumption of powers of
the courts of the United States."3' 1 The theory upon which this
doctrine rests is that in certain instances courts are acting unconstitutionally when they interpret a federal statute so broadly as
to bring within the range of federal judicial power matters not
confided to that government by the Constitution. " .. . This Court
and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are
reserved by the Constitution to the several states," says Mr. Justice Brandeis.3 2 The doctrine that a court is acting unconstitutionally when it misinterprets a statute has an element of refreshing
newness about it.
It is true that in this decision the doctrine is confined to situations in which the power of the federal judiciary is enhanced at
the expense of what are deemed to be the rights of the states.
However, if the federal courts are acting unconstitutionally when
they misinterpret the Tenth Amendment, what about their misinterpretation of other provisions of the Constitution? Was the Supreme Court acting unconstitutionally when it decided the case
of Long v. Rockwood 3 which held that the state is without power
to tax patent royalties? This decision was expressly overruled in
Fox Film Corporationv. Doyal.3 4 Did the Supreme Court "invade"
the reserved power of the state to tax in the Long case? Or must
we say that this is a mere restriction of the rights of the state
without a corresponding usurpation of power by the federal court?
Justice Brandeis attempts to distinguish between an unconstitutional course of conduct on the part of the courts and a mere
series of erroneous decisions. He clearly intimates that if the only
proposition before the court was that Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act had been misinterpreted, then the court would not be justified
in overturning a huge body of decided law to correct the error.3 5
31. Dissenting opinion in Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v.

Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 533, 48 S.Ct. 404,
72 L.Ed. 681 (1928) quoted in the opinion of the Court in the Erie case, 58 S.
Ct. at 823 (1938).
32. Ibid.
33. 277 U.S. 142, 48 S.Ct. 463, 72 L.Ed. 824 (1928).
34. 286 U.S. 123, 52 S.Ct. 546, 76 L.Ed. 1010 (1932).
35. "If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should
not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a

century." 58 S.Ct. at 822 (1938).
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Congress could have done that with complete propriety at any
time but did not do so. The principle that an interpretation of a
statute long acquiesced in and widely followed may not lightly
be disturbed would have persuaded the court not to act. However,
where the issue is usurpation of authority by the courts, then in
the words of Justice Holmes there has been "an unconstitutional
assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States which no
lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."38
The distinction the court drew here is a fine one. In fact Mr.
Justice Reed refused to accept it, preferring to regard the decision
of Swift v. Tyson as error rather than usurpation. 7 Let us see
whether we can discern wherein the distinction lies. To begin
with, it will be admitted broadly that federal courts are bound by
the Constitution as well as the other branches of the government.
Hence, if a federal court were to deny to a defendant in a criminal
case the right to confront the witnesses against him, the action
would be clearly unconstitutional.
Or, to take another example, in Hayburn's case,38 certain federal circuit courts refused to administer the Revolutionary pension
rolls on the ground that this would be a usurpation of executive
power by courts and hence would violate the principle of separation of governmental powers. Suppose the circuit courts had decided otherwise and the Supreme Court first sustained this action
and later repudiated it? Could it be said that in the interim between decisions of the Supreme Court the circuit courts had been
acting unconstitutionally?
In Adkins v. Children's Hospital" the Supreme Court effectively prevented Congress from prescribing the basis of minimum
wages of working women in the District of Columbia. This case
was subsequently overruled. 40 Can it be said that the first decision
was unconstitutional since in it the court misinterpreted the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment?
We should be inclined, I believe, to regard Long v. Rockwood
and Adkins v. Children'sHospital as erroneous decisions; and the
36. Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow
Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 516, 533, 48 S.Ct. 404, 72 L.Ed. 681 (1928).
37. "It seems preferable to overturn an established construction of an act
of Congress, rather than, in the circumstances of this case, to interpret the
Constitution." 58 S.Ct. at 828 (1938).
38. 2 U.S. 408, 1 L.Ed. 436 (1792).
39. 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923).
40. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed.
703 (1937),
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confrontation case and the pension roll case as instances of unconstitutional action by the courts. The distinction, then, is this:
To define constitutional power incorrectly is error. To exercise
power thus wrongfully defined is unconstitutional action. Ordinarily, these two functions are separate. Courts are usually called
upon to define the limits of the powers of other agencies. When,
however, courts have occasion to define the limits of their own
power, then such interpretation ordinarily results in the wrongful
exercise of power. In the Long case, 41 the court wrongfully defined
42
the taxing power of the state, and in the first minimum wage case
it incorrectly imposed a limitation upon the power of Congress. In
neither instance was judicial power increased or diminished. On
the other hand, in the supposed confrontation case and the pension
roll case, judicial power would be increased if the court made an
erroneous decision. In the first, the court would have permitted
itself to dispense with the constitutional requirement for confrontation, while in the second case it would have usurped an executive function in administering pension rolls.
Applying this analysis to the Erie case, we may now say that
in Swift v. Tyson the court was in error when it construed Section
34 as not applicable to state decisions on matters of general jurisdiction. Then, when it imposed its own rule in the decision of a
matter of this sort, it acted unconstitutionally.
The second interesting constitutional aspect of the Erie case is
its dictum that Congress is without power to enact a statute directing the federal courts to disregard state decisions and to apply
their own rules of law in diversity cases. This proposition is necessarily inherent in the decision of the court even though it expressly declared that in disapproving the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson it did "not hold unconstitutional section 34 of the Judiciary
Act or any other Act of Congress."4 In an earlier part of the opinion the court says "Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local
in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of
the law of torts."44 Now, if Congress may not direct federal courts
to ignore state decisions, it likewise may not direct them to ignore
state statutes, or any other type of state law. Hence, the federal
41.
42.
(1923).
43.
44.

Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142, 48 S.Ct. 463, 72 L.Ed. 824 (1928).
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785
58 S.Ct. at 823 (1938).
58 S.Ct. at 822 (1938).
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courts would have to apply state law no matter what Congress
did. In a word, according to the majority view the enactment of
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act, on the books since 1789, was a
work of supererogation. It need not be added, of course, that the
Court did not draw this invidious conclusion. Yet the writer is
unable to see how such an inference can be escaped.
Moreover, if as the majority says, the federal courts have no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a state, how are the federal courts to decide cases when no applicable state court decision exists? Would not this equally be an invasion of state rights? Again, if a federal court ventures to lay
down a rule of common law in the absence of state decisions what
happens to such a rule when the state courts finally speak? And
would the voice of an inferior state court suffice to still that of the
relevant federal court? Or must the state court of last resort be
heard? These and similar questions await determination by the
federal courts. How they will be answered is pure matter of conjecture, although analogies will doubtless be furnished by decisions where state statutes and questions of local interest have
been involved.45 However, it must not be forgotten that when the
federal courts dealt with these gaps in the past, they were not
faced with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court that the application of other than state law by federal courts in these matters is an unconstitutional usurpation of power.
Mr. Justice Reed dissented from the intimation in the majority opinion that Congress does not have constitutional power to
authorize federal courts to depart from state decisional rules. He
points out that Congress may unquestionably regulate procedure
in federal courts, and that procedure and substance merge indiscriminately. He seems to conclude from these premises that Congress would therefore have the power to legislate concerning rules
of decision in cases admittedly within the jurisdiction of federal
courts. The "necessary and proper" clause of Article I, section 8
is invoked to bolster this rather doubtful line of reasoning.
In partial answer to this argument it might be said that although the line between procedure and substantive law is hard
to draw, the areas themselves are quite different. If lawyers were
unable to grasp the distinction between the rules of law to be
applied, and the way of applying them, there would indeed be no
45. For instances of such filling of gaps see Doble, Federal Jurisdiction
and Procedure (1928) 563-565.
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difference between form and substance. Yet, the fact that some
rules of law are rules of procedure does not mean that all rules
of law are procedural, and the constitutionality of a statute which
should direct federal courts to disregard state decisions may not
rest on ignoring the fundamental difference between procedure
and substantive law.
Yet the writer is in essential agreement with Justice Reed
since he is unable to see why Congress could not enact a "Nonconformity Statute" if it so desired.46 Federal jurisdiction extends
over diversity cases. Why may not federal rules of decision likewise govern diversity matters? Article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides:
"The judicial power shall extend ...

to all cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which
the United States shall be a party; to controversies between
two or more States; between a State and citizens of another
State; between citizens of different States..."
The article does not prescribe rules of decision in the exercise of
this jurisdiction. State law need not be applied to cases affecting
Ambassadors (we presume), nor to cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, nor to controversies to which the United States
is a party, nor to controversies between two or more states.47 Why,
then, must state law be applicable to controversies between citizens of different states?
It may be highly desirable that federal courts apply state decisions, but does the Constitution enjoin it? It might be in the interest of uniformity that the Rules of Decision Act be in force
with respect to "judicial" law (a proposition highly debatable).
But if Congress should enact a code of federal law for diversity
matters would the result be unconstitutional? It is hard to point
to any section of the Constitution which would forbid this action,
and it seems clear on analogy to its other provisions that the
Judiciary Article permits it. At any rate, the members of the
First Congress (many of whom attended the Constitutional Convention) must have thought conformity was at least a matter of
46. "The Judiciary Article, 3, and the 'necessary and proper' clause of Article 1, § 8, may fully authorize legislation such as this section of the Judiciary Act." Per Justice Reed, 58 S.Ct. at 828 (1938).
47. "Precisely analogous reasoning has sustained the power of Congress to
prescribe substantive law for admiralty cases, even those over which the -commerce power does not extend." McCormick and Hewins, supra note 9, at 135.
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doubt. Otherwise they would not have legislated as they did in
enacting Section 34.
A third constitutional aspect of the case is the question
whether the determination of unconstitutionality was gratuitous.
Mr. Justice Reed thought the question need not have been raised
since the only point at issue was whether the court misinterpreted Section 34 in deciding Swift v. Tyson. It is certain that the
majority did not meet this objection squarely. Undoubtedly, Justice Reed's position would dispose of the case in the same way as
did the majority, without raising the question of constitutionality.
And it is a canon of constitutional construction too well known to
require citation that the issue of constitutionality must not be
raised in order to enable the court to pass upon matters not necessary to the decision of the case.
Finally, the dissenters raise an interesting question of the interpretation of that part of the President's Court Plan which was
enacted into law. To the writer's knowledge, this is the first judicial construction of that statute. The act of August 24, 1937, provides in part as follows:
"Whenever the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question in any court of
the United States in any suit or proceeding to which the United
States, or any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is not a party, the court having
jurisdiction of the suit or proceeding shall certify such fact to
the Attorney General. In any such case the court shall permit
the United States to intervene and become a party for presentation of evidence (if evidence is otherwise receivable in such
suit or proceeding) and argument upon the question of the
constitutionality of such Act. In any such suit or proceeding
the United States shall, subject to the applicable provisions of
law, have all the rights of a party and the liabilities of a party
as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the constitutionality of
'
such Act.' 4
The minority contended that even though the majority expressly
refrained from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 34,
yet it cannot be denied that the constitutionality of the Act was
"drawn in question.' 9 That is to say, regardless of the final out48. 50 Stat. 751 (1937) 28 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1938).
49. 58 S.Ct. at 827 (1938).
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come of the question of constitutionality, the United States is entitled to the rights of an intervenor. It would seem to go without
saying that the minority is correct on this point. The duty of the
court to notify the Attorney General when the constitutionality
of an act is drawn in question is plain, and the duty exists no matter what view of the statute the court may take. In a word, the
court may not prejudge a question of constitutionality, even
though its decision is that the statute is constitutional. It is true
that in the Erie case the constitutionality of Section 34 was raised
for the first time in the Supreme Court, yet the statute is still applicable since it specifies "any court of the United States."
Technically, the holding of the majority on the matter of constitutionality was that while Section 34 of the Judiciary Act was
valid, the action of federal courts under it was unconstitutional.
Can it be said that the new Court Act has no application where
it is admitted that the relevant federal statute is valid, but the
issue is unconstitutional enforcement or interpretation of the act?
If so, then the draughtsmen of the Court Act have missed an
important point. For surely, the United States government is
interested in being heard whenever executive or administrative
enforcement of a valid federal law is challenged as unconstitutional. Can it be said that presumably the government is not
equally anxious that the Attorney General be heard when the
issue is unconstitutional action by the courts? It is believed that
it can not, especially where legislative or executive action is
likely to be affected.
CONCLUSION
The Erie case is a monumental decision. Much federal law
will be changed by it and many cases of an important nature may
be expected as its aftermath. Reviewing the far-reaching consequences of the decision, the writer is inclined to agree with the
dissenting minority that a rehearing should have been granted in
order to give the Court opportunity to hear learned counsel representing all interests involved. Certainly, more mature reflection
might have cleared up certain anomolous positions in the majority
opinion, although it is easy to see from the temper of the court
that not even the most elaborate reconsideration of the Erie case
would have saved the much controverted rule of Swift v. Tyson.
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